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Community Partnered Procurement- A socially sensitive option for 
procurement of urban infrastructure for low income communities.  
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide information for promoting increased involvement of 
low income urban communities in the procurement of neighbourhood (tertiary level) 
infrastructure. The contexts are several and varied including 
• upgrading works carried out by urban government 
• donor funded urban development programmes 
• programmes initiated by NGOs.  
 
The paper aims to introduce the potential benefits to be gained from community partnered 
procurement(CPP). The content of the paper applies to those frequently occurring, low risk, 
routine small infrastructure works which characterise neighbourhood urban upgrading 
programmes and projects. We investigate cases relating to water supply, sanitation, drainage, 
access, paving, street and security lighting, solid waste removal, and community buildings. It 
is not applicable to complex, large, high risk and high hazard infrastructure projects.  
 
The findings are based on the results of interviews and a review of literature, documents and 
project files on urban upgrading projects in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. We are particularly 
grateful to the many government officials who so generously gave their time to us, and 
provided access to very detailed information on a wide range of both community-based 
infrastructure works and conventional procurement contracts.  
 
 
Background  
 
The urban population in most developing countries is increasing extremely rapidly. 
Conventional approaches have proved inadequate to meet the demand for shelter and services 
created by this rapid urban growth and this has led to a proliferation of informal, unimproved 
slum and squatter settlements where the inhabitants generally experience high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment. The United Nations Center for Human Settlements 
suggests that between 40% and 50% of the population in many cities live in such settlements; 
according to present trends, this is likely to increase.. The ability of government to provide 
infrastructure is already far outstripped by the inexorable increase in demand, so that the 
poorest and most vulnerable will continue to suffer from the lack of services and work 
opportunities. 
 
This paper is about the procurement of infrastructure; that is, what mechanisms, both conventional 
and unconventional, government and non-government, have been adopted in efforts to deliver 
improved services. We explore the mechanisms and processes of agreements, procedures and 
contracts that are the basis for implementation of infrastructure improvements for urban low income 
communities. The specific focus is on situations where communities have taken a part in the 
planning and implementation of their neighbourhood infrastructure; this we term community 
partnered procurement(CPP). It is clear that this approach has wider socio-economic impacts 
which are generally beneficial.  
 
 2
There is increasing international interest in promoting the participation of community groups in 
improving access to basic services at the household and neighborhood levels. There is a 
substantial body of work addressing the issues of community participation and empowerment, 
which identifies barriers to increased community participation and suggests ideas and 
techniques for tackling the problems. These include the many currently popular tools related 
to PRA.  Broadly speaking, this approaches matters internally, that is, the focus is on the 
community, although appropriate institutional responses to increase the levels of participation 
are also considered.  
 
However, with regard to community partnered procurement an additional set of barriers exist, 
namely the rules and procedures which urban government adopts in relation to procurement. 
These provide the framework within which urban government operates and the key question 
is whether existing rules and procedures offer any scope for the increased community 
participation which is being advocated. We therefore look in detail at why these procedures 
are used and how they work; we believe that understanding these processes is central to 
increasing the access of community groups to the funds and other resources of urban 
government 
 
There are cases where community partnered procurement operates outside the purview of 
urban government and we have included some examples . However, our main objective in 
writing this paper is to offer guidance as to how such local initiatives can be successfully 
integrated with urban government, as we believe that in this way it may be possible to see 
more responsive urban government and to increase the access which the urban poor have to 
resources for improved services 
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Infrastructure Procurement 
 
Procurement is the process of buying the goods, works or services, which in our case 
comprise the infrastructure and services described previously. In engineering terms, the works 
themselves are minor and usually of low cost, but are nevertheless complex to implement 
given the physical and social fabric of low income urban areas. We adopt the term micro-
contract to refer to the countless number of small contracts for works which are the mainstay 
of urban improvement in South Asia. The contract value is typically less than £10 000. and 
the duration less than one year. 
 
At this stage, it is useful to consider briefly some of the basic concepts which will be central to the 
analysis of our findings. The procedures refer to the organized system within which projects are 
conceived, planned, and brought into being by urban government. The contract is a legally binding 
agreement between parties based on an offer by one party to do something (in our case to construct 
the infrastructure) in return for a consideration (that is, payment). 
 
In urban government in South Asia, the most commonly used procedures for the procurement of 
infrastructure are those which lead to the award of contracts through competitive tender. Their 
underlying objectives are concerned with ensuring competition which is viewed as a key factor 
in achieving the twin objectives of 
• Accountability in the spending of public money 
• Transparency in the steps of the decision-making processes  
 
In relation to the actual contracts, we need to focus on who is involved in a contract and what their 
various obligations are. The most commonly used engineering contracts recognize a ‘triangle of 
actors’: Promoter; Engineer; and Contractor, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A typical case in South Asia (and elsewhere) involves urban government letting a contract to a 
private sector contractor for the construction of infrastructure improvements. Urban government is 
the promoter; they have planned and designed the work, and are paying for it to be implemented. 
Urban government appoints an Engineer, who is usually in the full time employment of the relevant 
government department. It is rare for private sector consultants to fulfill this role for minor 
engineering works in South Asia. In accordance with the procedures laid down a contractor is 
appointed to do the actual construction work.  
 
The Engineer has the important role of ensuring that the interests of the promoter are met, and that 
the contractor is duly paid for his efforts. The promoter wants the best value for money and the 
contractor wants a good profit; whilst this can involve an enormous range of complex and 
contentious issues, satisfying the various interests often comes down to ensuring that a ‘triangle of 
objectives’ are met: 
Cost: has the work been completed within the costs agreed in the contract ? 
Quality: has the work been done in accordance with what was specified ? 
Time: has the work been satisfactorily completed within the time specified ? 
 
The traditionally accepted objectives of procurement procedures and contract documents are 
to ensure that works are executed at the minimum cost that is consistent with the need to 
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achieve a product of acceptable quality within an acceptable timeframe.  They do this by 
reducing uncertainty, which in turn is done by: 
• clearly defining who is liable to take any risk that cannot be eliminated from the project; 
• providing information on the work to be carried out so that all concerned are clear about what 
has to be done and what their role is in doing it. 
 
 
Why Community Partnering ? 
 
Community groups and individual householders do not figure anywhere in the procedures, contracts 
and documentation used in these circumstances. It is assumed that they are passive consumers who 
are deemed to be satisfied if works are undertaken to the satisfaction of the promoter i.e. the 
concerned agency of urban government. However, is this assumption justified, and if not what are the 
implications ? 
 
Normal government practice is based on the twin assumptions that a competitive market for 
infrastructure provision exists and that the best way to operate in this market is through competitive 
tendering procedures. The competitive market only works in practice if contractors act 
independently; this does not always happen in practice. Certain situations exist where contractors are 
concerned with stability rather than expanding their market share and maximising their profitability; 
the outcome is that they share out the available work between them. One consequence of this 
‘pooling’ of work is that the assumption that conventional tendering procedures will produce the 
lowest cost work is not justified in practice. 
 
The role of the Engineers in urban government is to ensure that objectives relating to cost, quality and 
time are achieved. The objective which is most difficult to assess, and causes most concern, is the 
quality of the finished work. The fact is that neither they as supervisors nor the government as 
promoters are primary stakeholders with a strong motivation for ensuring that adequate work 
practices and standards are maintained.  
 
Therefore it is questionable whether value for money is achieved; thus several reasons for promoting 
community partnering arise. 
• Community members are directly affected by the way in which work is carried out and have 
a strong incentive to see that it is carried out properly.  
• Resources can be channeled into the community rather being siphoned off by outside contractors. 
Whereas conventional procurement of infrastructure has a singe benefit, the provision of the 
infrastructure itself, community partnering can double the benefits obtained from investment.  
Infrastructure is provided and employment opportunities and enterprises are created in the 
community.  
• People are empowered to take more control of their own lives.   
• Increased access to local knowledge is gained on such issues as the location of existing service 
and a reduction in the potential for disputes with community members in the course of work on 
site. 
 
These arguments can be opposed on a number of grounds. Many government engineers are sceptical 
about the ability of the community partnering to provide services to the required standard.  Others 
fear that community partnering is likely to prove too complex to be much use in practice. 
Nevertheless, we have found  that the involvement of community members and groups in the 
procurement of their local infrastructure is quite widespread but not, at present, great in scale. 
Consequently there are a number of questions to be addressed  
• if the procedures, contracts and documentation do not foresee a role for community members and 
groups, then how have existing community-based initiatives worked ? 
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• to what extent do existing procedures create barriers to greater involvement of community groups 
as primary stakeholders ? 
• how can these barriers be overcome in a way which is acceptable to urban government ?  
• is there potential for increasing the scale of community partnering to a level at which it impacts on 
conditions in low income informal areas at a national scale ? 
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Performance of Community Partnered Procurement 
 
It is necessary to review how the performance of these relatively limited experiences 
compares with the conventional tender contract systems. As a starting point we attempt some 
comparisons with the traditional performance measures of procurement contracts, namely 
time, cost, and quality of work. In order to achieve credibility, community partnered 
procurement needs to measure up at least as well as the tender contract system on these 
traditional performance indicators. 
 
Cost. The use of informal negotiation to agree prices and resolve operational problems is an 
important feature of community partnering. However, with regard to agreeing a price, there 
needs to be a basis around which the negotiations can proceed. Cost estimates based on the 
existing Schedule of Rates has been used in Sri Lanka and India; this creates problems for 
community groups unless estimations based on market rates are also made. The market testing 
approach has also been tried.  
 
The specific evidence we have uncovered from a preliminary analysis of individual 390 micro 
contracts  in India and Pakistan and Sri Lanka indicates that the final price for  community 
partnered works is lower than for the conventional tender contract system. The mean cost 
growth (that is, the ratio of actual completion cost to the contract cost) for 239 cases of 
conventionally procured works using the tender contract system is 1.0, whereas for 151 
community partnered procurement arrangements the mean value is 0.90. The key point is that 
this outcome is achieved through negotiating down the rates for the work.  
 
Time. The required completion time is specified in the conventional tender contract system; 
penalties such as liquidated damages can be invoked, although interviews with engineers 
suggest that in practice this is hardly ever done on micro contracts. The mean time growth 
(that is, the ratio of the actual lapse time of the construction to the duration stated in the 
contract) for 239 cases of conventionally procured works using the tender contract system is 
1.5, whereas for 151 community partnered procurement arrangements the mean value is 1.9. 
It is not clear why this is so large compared with the cost growth reported above; the 
implication is that cost growth is a serious concern to supervising engineers and they control 
it in order to avoid getting into personal difficulty. There does not seem to be a similar 
pressure to control time overrun. We do not yet have a similar quantitative analysis for 
community partnered works, but have found little concern with completion time, to the extent 
that it is often not mentioned at all in the agreements. In Sri Lanka, the NHDA guidelines for 
community based works contain a liquidated damages clause, although officials comment that 
they would never intend invoking it. The impression is that with community partnering 
arrangements there is sufficient incentive available for the work to be completed without the 
need for invoking penalties.  
 
The detailed findings of the investigations into time and cost growth in micro contracts will 
be published separately. 
 
Quality. It is difficult to measure quality of work in a quantitative way, and to date we have 
only found subjective opinions.. Supervision of work by community groups is reported to be 
successful. The Sri Lankan experience reports improved quality. There are no reported cases 
of the quality of the work being worse with community partnering. It is nevertheless 
important to note that some of the experiences are the outcome of an approach which has 
taken some considerable time and experimentation to come to fruition; the mistakes made 
along the way are less frequently reported. We conjecture that the time overrun described 
above is likely to have a deleterious effect on quality. The cost of materials rises with time 
(quite dramatically in some case study cities); if the total contract cost is closely controlled 
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(as is the case) and material costs have risen, then it is conceivable that the contractor absorbs 
this by reducing the quality of work to below that specified. 
 
Clearly, cost and quality are closely inter-related. The routine application of government 
procedure almost without fail selects the cheapest bid, which in certain circumstances 
compromises the quality of the final product.  
 
This is symptomatic of a highly controversial argument about levels of service and design 
standards which has to be faced up to. Traditionally, planners and engineers develop 
infrastructure schemes based on predefined notions of what is best; these are reflected in the 
Codes of Practice and Standards which are often unrealistically high and inappropriate for the 
circumstances. For example in Faisalabad;Pakistan, in an upgrading programme,  people want 
a service which is within their reach, built to standards which are appropriate for the 
circumstances, rather than something which somebody else has decreed is better for them. 
This, in fact, is no more than the sound approach which a supplier of consumer goods takes; 
develop products which customers want and will buy. Standards can no longer be ‘absolute’ 
and applied in a vacuum without reference to the customers. 
 
 
Wider Benefits of Community Partnered Procurement 
 
Local infrastructure improvements are usually predicated on benefits to environmental health. 
Our investigations lead us to believe that community partnered procurement of infrastructure 
may enable much wider objectives (in addition to the traditional environmental health 
benefits) to be achieved through addressing the poverty agenda in relation to  
• the participation process as a means of offering empowerment and greater control to 
households and community groups; 
• employment opportunities leading to income generation for low income groups who are 
paid for undertaking work associated with government funded infrastructure 
improvements;  
• small enterprise development as local micro-contractors develop and exploit the niches 
created;  
• other benefits to the local micro-economy such as increased business for  building 
materials suppliers. 
 
Examples included: 
• In India the community started questioning and understanding the actions of the 
government officials as a part of empowerment.  
• Money gets circulated in the local economy in cases of Pakistan.  
• Opportunities of informal training for the local artisans and community members. 
• Local capacity building and in some cases micro-enterprise development for example in 
Sri-Lanka and Pakistan. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Community Partnering 
The concept of Community Partnering embraces the variety of roles and responsibilities 
described in Sections 2 and 3. It reflects the continued involvement of people with the 
planning, implementation and sustenance of local infrastructure and service improvements, 
and with income generation, enterprise development and skills training. This implies 
• full acceptance of the urban poor as primary stakeholders in local infrastructure provision 
• developing longer term more open-ended relationships, encompassing joint financing, 
planning, design, implementation, hand over and maintenance 
• promoting co-operation both formally and informally with government agencies and NGOs 
• wider targeting of the urban poor, rather than solely area-based dwellers in specific slums,  
as local inhabitants do not necessarily carry out improvement works themselves because of 
lack of both time and relevant skills. 
 
